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The Defendant, BARBARA JOYCE HOWELL, respectfully submits this
brief

in opposition

to

the

Plaintiff's

Petition

for Writ

of

Certiorari.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the question presented by the Petitioner is of

the character and scope necessary to be considered by the Utah
Supreme Court on certiorari or whether the decision of the Court of
Appeals is case and fact specific, thus not entitling Petitioner to
a Writ of Certiorari under the provisions of Rule 46 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
2.

Whether the decision by the Utah Court of Appeals in this

matter has created a new rule in awarding alimony or whether it is
instead consistent with prior case law.
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(1) (1989):
When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders
relating to the children, property, and
parties.
Rule 46, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure:
Review by a writ of certiorari is not a matter
of right, but of judicial discretion, and will
be granted only for special and important
reasons.
The following, while neither
controlling nor wholly measuring the Supreme
Courtfs discretion, indicate the character of
reasons that will be considered:
(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;

(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has decided a question of state or federal law
in a way that is in conflict with a decision
of the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals
has rendered a decision that has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings or has so far sanctioned
such a departure by a lower court as to call
for an exercise of the Supreme Court's power
of supervision; or
(d) When the Court of Appeals has decided
an important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant does not dispute the initial paragraph of the
Plaintiff's statement of the case.
clarify

and

supplement

the

However, the Defendant would

remaining

Plaintiff's statement of the case.

facts

outlined

in

the

To begin with, the substantial

discrepancy between the Plaintiff's income at the time of the
filing of the Complaint and the time of trial, two years later, was
due in large part to a mutual decision of the parties during their
marriage.

Specifically,

the

Plaintiff's

employer.

Airlines, suffered severe financial problems in 1984.

Western
At that

time, Western Airlines asked its pilots to accept a wage freeze
(TR. 113).

The parties agreed to do so, and as a result, the

family experienced a financial strain during that period of time
(TR. 217). In 1986, Delta took over operation of the airlines, and
Mr. Howell began receiving increased compensation (TR. 114). The
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Court

of Appeals

recognized

this

sacrifice

and

stated

that

"Plaintiff's ability to take advantage of that change [to Delta]
was at least in part a result of having persevered during the lean
times, as did his wife and children." Howell v. Howell, 155 Utah
Adv. Rptr. 15, 19 (February 28, 1991).
In addition, although the Complaint was filed in 1986 and the
trial was conducted in 1988, the parties attempted at least one
reconciliation during that period of time (TR. 42). Contrary to
the Plaintiff's statement that the trial court determined the
standard of living of the parties by examining the five (5) years
prior to the divorce, the trial court averaged the Plaintiff's
income earned over the five (5) years prior to the filing of the
Complaint in 1986 (Findings of Fact, Nos. 5, 6 and 7).
Based upon this finding as to the standard of living, the
trial court awarded Mrs. Howell permanent alimony in the amount of
$1,800.00 per month (Decree of Divorce U 6). Mrs. Howell appealed,
among other issues, this alimony award, arguing that it was an
abuse of discretion in light of the disparity between the parties1
incomes, the length of the marriage, and the Defendant's needs and
lack of specific job training or skills. Mrs. Howell also argued
that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine
the award of alimony using the current income of the Plaintiff at
the time of trial to establish his ability to pay alimony, while at
the same time basing the parties' standard of living on the reduced

3

income earned by the Plaintiff during the years 1981 through 1986.
(See Mrs. Howell's Appellate Brief at Page 1.)

The Court of

Appeals agreed with the Appellant that the trial court had abused
its discretion and remanded the case for a further determination
regarding the alimony award. (See Howell, 155 Adv. Rptr. at 21.)
The crux of the Plaintiff's Petition is that the Court of
Appeals failed to apply the appropriate standards for alimony and
that the decision will require the lower courts to project a
standard

of

marriage.

living

which

may

never

have

existed

during

the

However, Plaintiff's interpretation of the decision is

not supported by the language therein.
To begin with, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court
had abused its discretion in this case by looking at the preseparation standard of living in setting alimony rather than the
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage, including up to the
time of trial.

The Court of Appeals stated:

In so concluding we do not intend to establish
a rigid rule which must be followed in all
domestic cases, but acknowledge that trial
courts have discretion to determine the
standard of living which existed during the
marriage after consideration of all relevant
facts and equitable principles.
M . at 20.
In addition, the Court of Appeals carefully reviewed the trial
court's findings with respect to the three factors required to
determine alimony.

Because the trial court failed to make the
i
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requisite findings, the Court of Appeals remanded "for findings as
to Defendant's financial needs, the parties' standard of living at
the time of the trial, and for adjustment of the amount of alimony
to better equalize the parties1 abilities to go forward with their
respective lives." Ri. at 21.
Thereafter,

Plaintiff

filed

his

Petition

for

Writ

of

Certiorari.
ARGUMENT
PLAINTIFF CANNOT ESTABLISH A COMPELLING
REASON FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT.
The criteria governing the review by this Court of a matter
decided by the Court of Appeals is outlined in Rule 46 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the reasons enumerated therein
are not the only basis for review, they indicate the character of
reasons to be considered.

These reasons include:

(a) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision in conflict with a
decision of another panel of the Court of
Appeals on the same issue of law;
(b) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
decided a question of state or federal law in
a way that is in conflict with a decision of
the Supreme Court;
(c) When a panel of the Court of Appeals has
rendered a decision that has so far departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings or has so far sanctioned such a
departure by a lower court as to call for an
exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
supervision; or
(d)

When the Court of Appeals has decided an
5

important question of municipal, state, or
federal law which has not been, but should be,
settled by the Supreme Court.
In his brief, Plaintiff has failed to expressly state the
basis for review as required by Rule 46. The implied basis is that
the Howell decision is in conflict with other decisions of the
Court of Appeals and of this Court.

However, that is simply not

the case.
It is well settled in Utah that a trial court must consider
three factors in determining alimony.

First, it must consider the

needs of the recipient spouse; second, the ability of that spouse
to provide for his or her own needs; and third, the ability of the
payor spouse to pay alimony. (See Jones v. Jones, 700 P. 2d 1072
(Utah 1985); Olsen v. Olsen, 704 P.2d 564 (Utah 1983); and Naranjo
v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988).)
In addition, Utah case law requires consideration of the
standard of living enjoyed by the parties during the marriage in
making a determination of alimony.

For example, in the case of

Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144 (Utah App. 1988), the Court of
Appeals stated:
[Alimony] should, so far as possible, equalize
the parties1 'respective standards of living
and maintain them at a level as close as
possible to the standard of living enjoyed
during
the
marriage1.(citations
omitted)
•[T]he ultimate test of the proprietary of an
alimony award is whether, given all of these
factors, the party receiving alimony will be
able to support him - or herself as nearly as
possible to the standard of living
6

enjoyed during the marriage.f
Id. at 1147 (citations omitted).
Five

years

prior

to

the

Naranjo

decision,

indirectly addressed the standard of living issue.

this

Court

In Savage v.

Savage, 658 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1983), this Court stated:
Where a marriage is of long duration and the
earning capacity of one spouse greatly exceeds
that of the other, as here, it is appropriate
to order alimony and child support at a level
which will insure that the supported spouse
and children may maintain a standard of living
not unduly disproportionate to that which they
would have enjoyed had the marriage continued.
Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).
More recently, this Court has addressed the issue in the case
of Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988) . In Gardner, this
Court stated that "an alimony award should, after a marriage such
as

this

and

to

the extent

possible, egualize

the parties'

respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as
close as possible to that standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage."

Rl. at 1081 (emphasis added).

While the basis for the Plaintiff's Petition is his argument
that the Howell decision is inconsistent with prior case law,
including Gardner, that is simply not the case. Instead, the Court
of Appeals properly articulated the three factors which must be
considered by trial courts in making an alimony award, and then
scrutinized the trial court's findings in light of those factors.
The Court of Appeals found that while the trial court made findings
7

as to the parties' gross incomes, it did not make the requisite
finding as to Mrs. Howell's financial needs. (See Howell, 155 Utah
Adv. Rptr. at 2 0.)
The Court also reiterated the need for trial courts to analyze
these three

factors

in light of all the circumstances of the

parties including their standard of living.

The Court of Appeals

stated:
Therefore,
trial
courts
should
first,
determine the financial needs and resources
for both parties, by examining the three
factors enumerated. Second, the Court should
set alimony as permitted by those parameters,
to approximate the parties' standard of living
during the marriage as closely as possible.
It follows that if the payor spouse's
resources are adequate, alimony need not be
limited to provide for only basic needs, but
should also consider the recipient 'spouse's
station in life'. Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d
144, 147 (Utah 1978).
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah
1988), the Utah Supreme Court reviewed an
alimony award after a long-term marriage. The
court found that the alimony award in that
situation should, 'to the extent possible,
equalize the parties' respective standards of
living and maintain them at a level as close
as possible to that standard of living enjoyed
during the marriage.' 16.. at 1081.
Howell, 155 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 20 (other citations omitted).
Applying this standard to the facts of the Howell case, the
Court of Appeals concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for
the trial court to set the parties' standard of living at the preseparation

level

of

income.

This
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resulted

in

grossly

disproportionate post-divorce standards of living, allowing Mr.
Howell "a two to four times advantage" over Mrs. Howell. (Howell,
155 Utah Adv. Rptr. at 21.)

In reaching this conclusion, the Court

of Appeals expressly pointed out that:
[E]xact mathematical equality of income is not
required, but sufficient parity to allow both
parties to be on equal footing financially as
of the time of the divorce is required.
Id. at 21, fn. 3.
The Court of Appeals went on to expressly state that it was
not creating a rigid rule to be followed in all cases.

Instead, it

affirmed the trial court's broad discretion in determining alimony,
but found that, .in this case, the trial court had abused its
discretion in setting the standard of living at the pre-separation
level.
The Plaintiff relies on the dissent of Judge Bench as a basis
for review.

The thrust of Judge Bench's dissent is that the

majority has created a judicially unworkable requirement, because
a determination of the parties' standard of living at the time of
divorce

is

purely

speculative.

However, because

the

Howell

decision is consistent with prior case law, it creates no more
speculation than is already inherent in the process currently used
by

trial

courts.

In

this

case, the

trial

court

failed

to

appropriately analyze the disparate earning ability of the parties,
thereby making an alimony award which failed to provide any parity
between the parties' post-divorce standards of living. Because all
9

of these factors can be concretely measured by the trial court at
the time of trial, the determination is in no way speculative.
Lastly, to support his position, the Plaintiff relies upon the
case of Bridenbauqh v. Bridenbaugh, 786 P.2d 241 (Utah App. 1990)
and claims that the Howell decision is contrary to Bridenbauqh.
However, Bridenbauqh is easily distinguished on its facts.

The

issue before the court in that case was a petition to modify the
decree to terminate alimony.

The Petition was brought twenty-two

years after entry of the Decree of Divorce.

As such, Bridenbauqh

is wholly inapplicable.
CONCLUSION
This Court should deny the Plaintiff's Petition for Writ of
Certiorari

based

upon

compelling

reason

for

Plaintiff's
such

inability

review.

The

to

Howell

establish

a

decision

is

consistent with prior decisions of both the Court of Appeals and
the Utah Supreme Court, and is case and fact specific.

Plaintiff

is therefore not entitled to a Writ of Certiorari.
DATED this S^"

day of April, 1991.
GUSTIN, GREEN, STEGALL & LIAPIS

#AUL H. AtffPIS
HELEN YK CHRISTIAN
KIM M. LUHN
Attorneys for
Defendant/Appellant/Respondent
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